



Tsunami

- Power Markets 2000
- The Three Spikes
 - California On-Peak
 - California Off-Peak
 - Regional Off-Peak
- Current Events
- Resource Mix Changes





A Short Lesson In History and Geography

- How did we get here?
 What happened before AB 1980?
 The start of the competitive bulk market in electricity
 PURPA
 AB 1890
 Where are we?
- How does all this fit together?



Fifty years when nothing happened

- 1934 through 1979
- Customers arrived
- Rates generally fell
- No major institutional changes



What happened before AB 1980?

The competitive bulk power market
PURPA



The competitive bulk power market

- Started in 1980 with the Regional Power Act
 Smoothly represented the operating cost of the most expensive thermal plant operating until May 22, 2000
- Continues to operate without governmental supervision (with the exception of California and Alberta)



PURPA

- Jimmy Carter's most brilliant legacy
- Opened the generation market to free enterprise
- Lowered base load generation costs from \$1,000 to \$2,000 per kilowatt to \$500 today





AB 1890

 Senator Peace's brilliant compromise
 May a hundred provisions bloom, may a hundred agencies contend
 Purportedly the creation of competition, the law brought into place one of the most comprehensive interventions of government into business in U.S. history





Where are we?

The west coast of the U.S. and Canada is a single integrated electric market
 Prices in California this summer have driven prices from Edmonton to Tijuana
 California driven price increases have made transmission costs insignificant by comparison







How does all this fit together?

- California imports power in the summer
- The Pacific Northwest imports power in the summer
- Overall, the capacity surplus is large
- Energy surplus floats with regional hydro



Basic System Ops 101

- Prices -- both on-peak and off-peak have wildly diverged from fundamentals
- We have no evidence of shortage other than price
- Prices are inefficient -- they do not reflect the cost of new generation or the availability of substitutes
- We cannot be both surplus and deficit -- either we face interruption or an exercise of market power



Regional Hydro







Basic Economics

- With the exception of California and Alberta, the WSCC resembles a traditional commodity market
- Commodity markets reflect short term marginal cost (in our case fuel cost) until capacity limits are reached
- When a capacity limit is reached, prices increase until alternatives become preferable





Data Availability

- In spite of efforts by the California ISO and other parties to make data availability difficult most data is available
- Almost all large plants are available on a three month lag from the EPA
- The WSCC's EHV database is available with great difficulty and seems to have limited utility
- FERC and EIA database provide monthly generation and cost data for the great majority of utility and non-utility plants
- Utility loads -- especially Canadian utilities -are a problem



The Three Spikes

California On-Peak
California Off-Peak
Regional Off-Peak



California On-Peak

- ISO perceptions of shortage are proving very subjective
- Inadequate ISO methods are securing scarcity in the midst of abundance

Overall, in the contest between the ISO and the WSCC, the ISO is failing to prove their case











Undergeneration

Figure 13. Average Underscheduling of Loads and Generation by System Load Level (June, 2000)



Actual ISO Capacity



ISO Margins

 Capacity margin across the ISO's May and June emergencies averaged 32.1%
 Capacity margin across the ISO's emergencies from May through September averaged 20.1%
 Capacity margin after outages in December were 21.6%





An ISO Emergency



The Missing Peak

 Alamitos dispatch isn't close to maximum during system emergencies
 Overall, system dispatch matches emergencies poorly -- raising questions of how seriously the emergencies are taken by generators



The Missing Peak



Inefficient Peak Dispatch

- ISO plants dispatch erratically
- Although total capacity equals nameplate, actual dispatch averages only 50% of nameplate
- ISO dispatch doesn't even approach nameplate during system peaks



Inefficient Dispatch



California Off-Peak

- Hourly investigation of economic dispatch at California "marginal" plants indicate large changes in behavior -- both on-peak and off-peak
- Price responsiveness of dispatch has seemingly diminished dramatically



Encina: June 2000





South Bay: June 2000















Off-Peak Conclusions

It now costs the market 13 times as much to raise generation levels as it did in 1997
 Substantial evidence exists for signaling -- change production levels to check the responses of other generators
 Replacing the internet with major generating units as "tom-toms"



Regional Off-Peak

- Northern off-peak generation appears far more logical
- Marginal generating units in Oregon, and Washington do reflect traditional marginal dispatch rules
- Moving California plants to Oregon would increase generation from 30% to 50%



Optimal Dispatch: June 2000

Encina	180%
South Bay	164%
Hermiston	100%
Gadsby	120%
Naughton	101%



Bottom Line

- California thermal dispatch is clearly distorted -- plants are not dispatching at levels remotely near cost
- California perceptions of shortage are erratic and unverifiable -- also not shared even within the state
- Sufficient data is now available to estimate the cost of market power to consumers



Estimating Impact

- Sufficient data is now available to estimate the level of prices
- A statistical approach allows estimating of the impacts of capacity availability, hydro generation, natural gas prices, and ISO/PX impacts from July 1995 to August 2000
- The analysis can be updated as additional data becomes available from FERC, the EIA, and NR Canada



Calculated Refunds

On-Peak: 99.4 mills +/- 13.4 Mills
 Off-Peak: 32.6 mills +/- 8.4 Mills
 Refunds appropriate from May 22nd throughAugust 31st
 Additional data will continue to refine estimates on a month by month basis



On-Peak Price Impacts



Preliminary Analysis of California Price Impacts

Off-Peak Price Impacts



Governmental Intervention

- The history since 1998 is that governmental control of bulk power markets has proved very expensive
- Alberta's experiment has been as bad in its way as California's
- Proposed RTO solutions for the Pacific Northwest may well extend these deadweight costs throughout the region





Northwest RTO







Market Expectations

- "Future curves" are confused at best
 Most market participants predict prices reflecting short term distortions and long term natural gas prices
- While simple, these forecasts are hardly







Resource Choices

- When you have a hammer, all problems look like nails
- At natural gas prices in the \$2.00/mmbtu range natural gas dominated regional resource choice





Coal Technologies

	Pulverized Coal Steam-Electric	Atmospheric Fluid- Bed Steam-electric Power Plant	Coal Gasifier Combined-cycle Power Plant	Pressurized Fluid- Bed Combined-cycle Power Plant
Configuration	1x300	1x200, circulating bed	1x540, Destec process	1x340, bubbling bed, supercritical
Status	Mature commercial	Mature commercial	Early commercial	Demonstration
Typical Application	Bulk power supply	Bulk power supply	Bulk power supply	Bulk power supply
Unit Capacity (MW)	300	200	540	340
Availability (%)	85%	90%	86%	81%
Heat Rate (Btu/kWh)	10,070	10,290	8,490	8,510
Overnight Cost (\$/kW)	\$1,650	\$1,930	\$1,480	\$1,340
Fixed Operating Cost (\$/kW/yr)	\$48	\$39	\$15	\$39
Variable Operating Cost (mills/kWh) ³	1.1	1.3	5.4	1.0
Development & Construction Lead Time (Months)	48/36	48/36	36/38	36/36
Cash Flow (%/yr)	1/1/1/2/25/45/25	1/1/1/2/25/44/25	1/1/2/25/45/25	1/1/2/25/45/25
Service Life (Years)	40	40	30	30
Comparative Levelized Energy Cost (cents/kWh) ⁴	4.4	4.7	3.9	3.5



Pacific Northwest

- Natural gas plant locations tend to follow pipelines
- Coal unit locations tend to follow rail
- Given the path of current natural gas prices developers will begin to study maps of







Recommendations

 With the pressure on to replace markets with centralized solutions, we can expect increased volatility and inefficiency
 Plant selection should favor baseload
 At current prices coal is less expensive than gas

